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NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2005-08
ENDORSEMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (NEI) GUIDANCE
“RANGE OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
INCIDENTS”
ADDRESSEES
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have
permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed
from the reactor vessel.
INTENT
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS)
to endorse the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance titled “Range of Protective Actions for
Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, April 2005,” as an acceptable range of early-phase protective
actions that licensees may use in the event of a nuclear power plant incident.  This RIS requires
no action or written response on the part of addressees.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Section  50.47(b)(10), requires, in part, that
licensees develop a range of protective actions for the public in the plume exposure pathway
emergency planning zone (EPZ).  Also, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) requires that guidelines for the
choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, be
developed and in place. 
Section III, “The Final Safety Analysis Report,” of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that
plans for coping with emergencies contain information to provide assurance of coordination
among the supporting groups and with the licensee.  Therefore, changes to a licensee’s
emergency plan related to protective actions should be coordinated with the offsite response
organizations.  In this context, “coordinated” means that the licensee has contacted offsite
response organizations and informed them of the proposed change. 
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Due to the varied options in existing Federal guidance related to protective actions that may be
taken in the event of a nuclear power plant accident, NEI developed the attached guidance to
summarize a range of early-phase protective actions that may be used for nuclear power plant
incidents.  NEI requested NRC endorsement of the guidance in a letter dated April 27, 2005.  
SUMMARY OF  ISSUE 
The NRC is endorsing the NEI guidance titled “Range of Protective Actions for Nuclear Power
Plant Incidents, April 2005.”  The NEI guidance summarizes some of the published Federal
guidance on the implementation of protective actions, but it does not replace the Federal
guidance. 
The flowchart attached to the NEI guidance is identified as a summary of the industry positions
described in the NEI guidance.  If a licensee chooses to use the flowchart, the licensee should
determine the applicability of the flowchart to the licensee’s emergency plan, along with
consideration of site-specific plant, meteorological, and radiological conditions.
As ongoing studies related to the development of protective action recommendations are
completed, new information may warrant the revision of existing NRC guidance or the
development of additional Federal guidance. 
A licensee may use the NEI guidance to change its emergency plan; however, the licensee
should assure the plan is coordinated with offsite response organizations.  While the endorsed
NEI guidance provides an acceptable range of early-phase protective actions, a licensee may
continue to use existing Federal guidance for the licensee’s range of protective actions.      
BACKFIT DISCUSSION
This RIS endorses NEI guidance titled “Range of Protective Actions for Nuclear Power Plant
Incidents, April 2005,” as an adequate description of a range of early-phase protective actions
for the plume exposure pathway EPZ.  The NEI guidance examines the protective actions
detailed in current Federal guidance.  Any action on the part of addressees to use the guidance
endorsed by this RIS is strictly voluntary.  This RIS does not impose new or modified staff
requirements, or uniquely prescribe a way to comply with the regulations, or require any action
or written response.  Therefore, this RIS does not constitute a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109,
and the staff did not perform a backfit analysis.
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT
This RIS is not a “rule” under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. sections 801-808) and,
therefore, is not subject to the act.
FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION
A notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS was not published in the Federal
Register because it is informational and does not represent a departure from current regulatory
practice.RIS 2005-08
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PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This RIS does not contain information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).  Existing collection requirements under
10 CFR Part 50 were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval
number 3150-0011.
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an
information collection unless the requested document displays a currently valid OMB control
number.  
CONTACT
Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact(s) or the Lead Project
Manager listed below.
/RA/
Patrick L. Hiland, Chief
Reactor Operations Branch
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact: Robert Kahler, NSIR/DPR/EPD
(301) 415-2992
E-mail: rek@nrc.gov
Attachment: NEI Guidance, “Range of Protective Actions for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents,
April 2005”
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site,
http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.NEI Guidance
Range of Protective Actions for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents
April 2005
1.0 Purpose:
To detail the range of early phase (EPA 400 section 2.1.3) protective actions that may be used for nuclear power
plant incidents.
It is intended that licensees who incorporate the "Industry Positions" detailed below would be compliant with the
early phase protective action guidance.  This paper does not develop new guidance for protective actions; rather, it
establishes an industry position using existing guidance. It is not the intention of  this paper to provide
implementation instructions for protective actions for the public.
2.0 Discussion:
2.1 History
The range of protective actions that would be used to protect the public during a nuclear power plant incident has
been based on a strategy of evacuation and sheltering since the development of emergency plans for nuclear power
plants.  This paper will not attempt to recount past strategies or their associated bases, but will examine the
protective actions detailed in current guidance.
2.2 Current Guidance
10 CFR 50.47(b) (10) (Ref 1) contains the requirement for a licensee's emergency plan to contain a range of
protective actions.  Guidance related to the implementation of a range of protective actions was revised in the mid
1990's in NUREG 0654 Supplement 3 (Ref 2) and EPA 400 (Ref 3).
Each of the subject guidance documents  contains the same basic concepts of evacuation and sheltering as protective
actions.  However,  sufficient diversity exists within the guidance to have resulted in divergent protective action
schemes within the industry.  Specifically, the indications for, and implementation of each protective action differs
among licensees.  The remainder of this section examines the features of each guidance  document.
2.2.1  EPA 400
EPA 400 (Ref 3) retained the concepts of evacuation and sheltering as protective actions from previous  guidance.
EPA 400 revised the Protective Action Guidelines  (PAG) (Ref 3 Table 2-1)  and provided a basis for those
guidelines (Ref 3 Appendices B and C).  That document is applicable  to a broad range of  nuclear-related incidents
and therefore did not utilize some of the terminology germane to nuclear power plant licensees, such as emergency
action levels or emergency classification  levels.
Evacuation is defined as the urgent removal of people from an area to avoid or reduce high-level, short-term
exposure, usually from the plume or from deposited activity (Ref 3 Appendix A).  EPA 400 recommends
evacuation as the principle method of protecting the public and provided an analysis of the benefit of evacuation
versus health effects from radiation (Ref 3 Appendix C). The document provides specific details regarding when
evacuation should be recommended.
2.2.1  (continued)
Sheltering is defined as the use of a structure for radiation protection  from an airborne plume and/or deposited
radioactive materials (Ref 3 Appendix A).  EPA 400 recommends  sheltering as an alternative during certain
conditions such as short-duration releases or in the presence of evacuation hazards  such as weather or road
conditions,  or for special populations (Ref 3 section 2.3.1).  The reference notes that the effectiveness of sheltering
1varies widely due to protection  factor as a function of building construction, varying effectiveness  of air infiltration
blocking methods, and air exchange  with a structure.
EPA 400 notes multiple mechanisms that would cause sheltering to not provide a large protection factor (Ref 3
section C.2.4) and notes that the process of evaluating and implementing evacuation or sheltering is "far from an
exact science". (Ref 3 section 5.5.3)
2.2.2  NUREG 0654 Supplement 3
This document was issued after EPA 400 and was intended to simplify and clarify previously issued guidance. This
guidance references the dose-based protective action concepts in EPA 400, but relies primarily on plant conditions
as an indication  for protective actions.  NUREG 0654 is aligned with EPA 400 with respect to sheltering,
recommending it as an alternative  to evacuation  for short term releases or when impediments to evacuation exist.
Protective action guidance is summarized in Figure 1  of that document and calls  for immediate evacuation of  parts
of the EPZ in the event of "Actual or projected severe core damage or loss of  control of facility".  Such conditions
are considered  to exist coincident with a General Emergency classification  level.  The subject figure  also
recommends "Sheltering ...for controlled releases of radioactive  material ...if there is assurance that the release is
short term..." In addition, Figure 1 implies sheltering for populations that should be evacuated ". ..unless conditions
make evacuation dangerous..."
Figure 1  also updates the concept introduced in earlier guidance  for EPZ populations not evacuated  or sheltered by
recommending that "...advise remainder of plume EPZ to go indoors to monitor EAS  broadcasts."  The subject
document states that this is done so that the public "...will be able to receive additional  instructions, if necessary".
This action prepares the public for an evacuation, if  necessary, and improves the efficacy of the evacuation process.
The action itself does not provide protection to the public, and is not considered a protective action, though licensees
may include this action under recommended protective actions.
Section III of that document discusses the use or previous guidance (Appendix  I to NUREG 0654 (Ref 2) and the
subsequent Information Notice 83-28).  That section states that the referenced schemes  "...can continue to be used
with the proper understanding  of the concepts underlying the development."  The older guidance recommends  the
evacuation of approximately a 5-10 mile downwind sector under certain severe accidents.
2.2.3  10 CFR 50.47(b)(1 0):
This regulation was amended in 2001  to include "...the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI),  as appropriate"..
It required states to formally consider the inclusion of potassium iodine (KI) as a thyroid blocking agent and
incorporate  it into their emergency plans as appropriate.  Given this, KI would only be included in the licensees'
range of protective actions if the affected  State(s) decided to include it.
2.2.4  Recent Guidance
Regulatory  Issue Summary 2004-13 (Ref 6) was issued in 2004 for the purpose of clarifying to licensees the NRC
position that protective action schemes must include the consideration  of sheltering.  The RIS did not introduce any
new protective  action concepts or guidance.
23  Industry issues
NOTE:  The indtstry  positions  are not meant to  preclude  pre-planned  actions  developed to accommodate special
circumstances  at individual  sites. In such cases, actions may have been developed that are more conservative
than the industry  positions. Those pre-planned  actions should be retained  in the licensee emergency plan.
223.1  Evacuation
Issue  1:  Evacuation Decision  Points
EPA 400 (Ref 3)  utilizes  dose limits as a decision point for evacuation.  NUREG  0654 (Ref 2) uses plant  conditions
as a decision point for evacuation,  stating that evacuation  should take place when, "...Actual  or projected  severe
core damage or loss of control  of facility" exists,  and advises  the use of EPA PAG's to modify protective actions.
Most licensees have interpreted the above guidance  to mean:  evacuate  2 miles around and five miles downwind  at a
General Emergency (actions based on plant conditions),  then evacuate if EPA protective  action guidelines  are met
(actions based on dose).  This interpretation  is consistent with the definition of a General Emergency (Ref 4 and 5)
and the guidance  in NUREG 0654  (Rcf 2)  that suggests consideration of EPA PAG's.
Coincident with evacuation,  or where appropriate,  the sheltering  of the population,  the remainder  of the plume EPZ
should be advised to go indoors and monitor EAS broadcasts. (Ref 2)
Industryposition:
The minimum recommendation that shall be made at a General  Emergency is to evacuate approximately 2 miles
around  andS miles dowtnwindfron  ite plant. Subsequent reconnmiendations  should be based on the EPA PAG's,
changing plant conditionsfleld  data or changes in meteorological  conditions..  In addition  ithe remainder  of  the
plume EPZ should be advised to go indoors and  monitor  EAS broadcasts.
23.2  Sheltering
Issue 2:  Use of sheltering as an alternative to evacuation for short term releases.
Both NUREG  0654 (Ref 2) and EPA 400 (Ref 3) suggest that sheltering be performed  for short term (puff) releases
or wvhen it provides a benefit greater than evacuation.  In the context of emergency  conditions, prediction of release
duration is difficult.  Continuous and rapidly changing conditions, lack of or inaccurate  instrumentation  and
uncertainty of the timeliness and effectiveness of mitigative actions make such a prediction inherently inaccurate.
Moreover, choosing to shelter a population rather than evacuate  based on erroneous  release  duration estimation  can
result in significant health effects  on that population.  As such, it is appropriate  to identify likely sources  of short
term releases in the planning process, so that considered protective actions can be developed.  For example,
controlled  evolutions such as containment venting are characterized  by definitive  actions  that provide some  measure
of certainty regarding release duration  and resultant  doses.  On the other hand, releases  from unmonitored  release
paths would result in highly uncertain assessments  of source  term.
Industryposition:
A licensee shall  integrate the use of shelteringfor  short tern releases into their  protective action recommendation
schenme.  If a licensee cannot readily or accurately  determine release duration,  and dose or plant conditions
warrant,  then evacuation should be recommended.
Issue 3:  Use of sheltering for impediments
EPA 400 (Ref 3) provides  guidance to shelter when  EPA protective action guidelines are met, but evacuation is
impractical due to impediments. It lists impediments  such as severe weather,  long mobilization times  (such as
medical patients  or prisoners  and guards)  or traffic issues  (inadequate roads).  Similarly, NUREG 0654 (Ref 2)
suggests sheltering when conditions exist that make evacuation  dangerous or for transit dependent persons awaiting
transportation.  During an emergency,  licensees  typically are unaware of emergent impediments  to evacuation, as
that information  is obtained  and acted upon by offsite agencies.
However, the use of sheltering  for populations that cannot be expeditiously evacuated due to impediments is
required to be accommodated  in licensee emergency plans (Ref 6).  The industry position accommodates  this
requirement but acknowledges that typically  offsite agencies as the information source for evacuation impediments
during an emergency.  It is not intended that licensees solicit impediments during an emergency.
3In some instances, licensees have developed alternate plans for special circumstances,  in coordination with state and
local officials.  For example: a licensee plan that recommends evacuation at a Site Area Emergency due to
impediments that would be created by an evacuation of the public at a General Emergency.  In such cases, these
alternate plans should continue to be part of the emergency plan.
Industry position:
Licensee emnergency plans  shall include the use of  shelieringforpopulations  that cannot  be evacuated  due Jo
impediments. A licensee is responsiblefor  ensuring  that the development of  a  protective action recommendation
(PAR) be an infiormiedprocess  that does not exclude the consideration  of  impediments recognizing off-site
agencies  are ultimately responsiblefor  making protective  action decisions necessary to protect  health and using a
licensee's  PAR as appropriate  to off-site conditions. In  special  circumstances,  the licensee may incorporate  pre-
planned  actions more conservative than the industry  position, such as evacuating  at emergency classification
levels other than a General  Emergency.
Issue 4:  Effectiveness  of sheltering
EPA 400 (Ref 3) contains a significant range of guidance regarding the effectiveness of sheltering  ("...almost 100
percent to zero...").  That guidance also contains diverse practical suggestions regarding maximizing the
effectiveness of sheltering.  In addition, circumstances  are detailed as to when sheltering is ineffective.  The
diversity of this guidance, likely issues of public compliance with detailed sheltering instructions and time
constraints on protective action decision processes lead to a large number of  possible implementation schemes and
instructions of  varying usefulness.  The industry favors a qualitative  approach to sheltering that utilizes simple
instructions to the public for implementation. However, in accordance with RIS 2004-13, regardless of any
understanding  the licensee may have with state and local authorities, licensees shall recommend  sheltering,
consistent with existing guidance and the Industry Positions detailed in this paper.
Industry Position:
Licensee may opt to utilize a range  ofsheltering implementation  schemes, including:
*  The use of  qualitative  methodsfor determining  the effectiveness of  sheltering. Example, if certain
plant or radiological  conditions  exist, then shelter, OR
*  The use of quantitative  methodsfor determining  the effectiveness of  sheltering. Example, the
comparison of sheltering versus evacuation  doses.
233  Use of KI for the General Public
No industry issues associated with the implementation of this protective action
43.0  Summarv
The following flowchart summarizes the Industry Positions detailed in this paper:
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